Here’s the uncomfortable reality: China is now by far the world’s biggest commercial shipbuilder.
While the United States produces only about 80,000 compensated gross tons (CGT) per year—roughly 0.13 % of global output—China turns out about 21,000,000 CGT, more than 53 % of worldwide production.
Put differently, the United States launches fewer than five large commercial ships each year; China delivers around 1,700. That’s an enormous capability gap.
Even worse, China’s top yards are dual‑use: the same facilities that churn out bulkers, tankers, and container ships also build vessels for the rapidly expanding People’s Liberation Army Navy. Foreign customers ordering Chinese‑built ships therefore help subsidize Beijing’s challenge to American primacy in the Pacific.
America’s limited commercial shipbuilding base also poses direct national‑security risks. The U.S. Navy operates just 16 Replenishment Oilers and can call on another 10 commercial tankers through the Tanker Security Program. Yet in a Pacific conflict, the Navy estimates it would need 100–300 tankers. The last tankers built in the United States were delivered in 2017, and the few domestic yards capable of producing them are already committed to other Navy programs—leaving America reliant on South Korean and Japanese builders.
On April 17, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) published a notice titled “Notice of Action and Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China’s Targeting the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance.” Working in tandem with the April 9 executive order on “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” the notice outlines measures aimed at reversing decades of decline in U.S. shipbuilding.
This is a strong start. China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) are extensions of the Chinese Communist Party, charged with (a) eroding the industrial bases of rival nations and (b) fueling China’s naval and merchant‑fleet expansion. Beijing has employed every industrial‑policy lever to achieve those goals—and intends to dominate the South China Sea and broader Pacific, even at the risk of open conflict with the United States.
Combating this won’t be easy. The last major U.S. shipyard—Philly Shipyard, now owned by Korean conglomerate Hanwha—opened in 1996. Rebuilding capacity will require tens of billions of dollars to expand existing yards and construct new ones (the mission we’re pursuing at Valstad Shipworks).
But with targeted measures like those in the USTR action, coupled with broader industrial‑policy support for large‑scale investment, the United States can reverse decades of decline and reclaim a leading role in global shipbuilding.
It will demand time, money, and determination—but history teaches one lesson above all:
Never bet against the United States.
